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Abstract
This article provides an account of attempts at the inter-
national level to develop a normative framework relating 
to climate change and migration from late 2010 to mid-
2013 . It traces the “catalytic effect” of paragraph 14(f) of 
the Cancún Adaptation Framework (adopted in December 
2010), through to the concerted, but ultimately unsuccess-
ful effort of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) in 2011 to get states to agree to the for-
mulation of a “global guiding framework” on displacement 
relating to climate change and natural disasters . Finally, 
the article discusses the creation of the state-led Nansen 
Initiative in late 2012—a tentative “first step” towards 
international policy-making in this field—and the out-
comes of its first sub-regional consultation in the Pacific 
in May 2013 .
Résumé
Cet article rend compte des tentatives, au niveau interna-
tional, de développer un cadre normatif dans le domaine 
des changements climatiques et de la migration, qui ont eu 
lieu entre la fin de 2010 et le milieu de 2013 . Il retrace l’ef-
fet catalyseur du paragaphe 14(f) du Cancún Adaptation 
Framework (adopté en décembre 2010) par le biais des 
efforts concertés du Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies 
pour les réfugiés, mais qui n’on ultimement pas réussi à 
amener les états à s’entendre sur la formulation d’un cadre 
de travail global en matière de déplacements dus aux 
changements climatiques et aux désastres environnemen-
taux . Cet article discute enfin de la création de l’Initiative 
Nansen vers la fin de 2012 – un essai de première étape 
vers l’établissement de politiques internationales dans le 
domaine – et des résultats de sa première consultation 
régionale dans le Pacifique en mai 2013 .
Introduction
Over the past six or so years, a wealth of research has been 
published on the relationship between climate change and 
displacement. In part catalyzed by the publication of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s fourth assess-
ment report in 2007,1 scholars have sought to gather and 
refine empirical data about the impacts of climate change 
on human movement in particular regions and sub-regions 
of the world and to understand the role that climate change 
plays in driving such movement. While it is impossible to 
universalize the research findings, there is now a consensus 
on the following issues. First, climate change affects migra-
tion but cannot be isolated as the sole cause of movement. 
Rather, it interacts with and overlays other economic, social, 
and political drivers (or stressors) that themselves affect 
migration. It is a multi-causal phenomenon. Second, and 
closely linked to the previous point, climate change–related 
movement migration is a part of global migration dynam-
ics generally, rather than a discrete, independent category, 
and it needs to be understood within a wider development 
context, not just a humanitarian one.2 Third, while adapta-
tion can help to reduce vulnerability and enhance resilience, 
it is unlikely to stop the need for some migration.3 Indeed, 
migration can be a form of adaptation and a rational coping 
strategy, although the extent to which it is used to “flour-
ish,” rather than just to “survive,” depends upon a person’s 
resilience.4 Fourth, climate change–related displacement is 
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likely to take different forms and will require a variety of 
responses at the local, national, regional, and international 
levels.5 Comprehensive approaches are needed across 
government departments and international agencies. For 
instance, migration management should be linked with 
other policy objectives, including climate change adapta-
tion, disaster risk reduction, humanitarian responses, and 
sustainable development. Fifth, policies must be proactive, 
not just remedial, and there must be sufficient budgetary 
support for long-term planning. Finally, affected popula-
tions must be informed, consulted, and actively involved in 
decision-making and policy implementation through par-
ticipatory processes.
The past three years have witnessed the most concerted 
attempts so far by the international community to develop 
new normative frameworks on climate change and human 
movement, albeit with mixed success. What has become 
manifestly clear is that states want to retain control over 
these developments, both in terms of how the issue is repre-
sented and how responses are shaped. They are reluctant to 
assume formal obligations or to “delegate” responsibility to 
international organizations. 
This article provides an account of attempts at the inter-
national level to develop a normative framework relating 
to climate change and migration from late 2010 to mid-
2013. It traces the “catalytic effect” of paragraph 14(f) of 
the Cancún Adaptation Framework (adopted in December 
2010), whereby states parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)6 
recognized “climate change induced displacement, migra-
tion and planned relocation” as elements to be addressed 
within the framework of climate change adaptation.7 
This acknowledgement by states of the impacts of climate 
change on human mobility had threefold significance: as a 
matter of record; as a reference point to agitate for further 
action; and as a basis for securing adaptation funding to 
develop strategies on migration and resettlement. Against 
this backdrop, the article then examines the concerted, but 
ultimately unsuccessful, effort of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) throughout 2011 to 
get states to agree to the formulation of a “global guiding 
framework” on displacement relating to climate change 
and natural disasters.8 Finally, the article discusses the 
creation of the state-led Nansen Initiative in late 2012—a 
tentative “first step” towards international policy-making 
in this field—and the outcomes of its first sub-regional con-
sultation in the Pacific in May 2013. 
Much of the article’s focus is the strategic role played by 
UNHCR in putting the issue of climate change and displace-
ment onto the international agenda. Given states’ reluctance 
to implement their existing obligations under the Refugee 
Convention and other protection instruments,9 UNHCR 
recognized from the outset that it would face a considerable 
challenge in motivating states to agree to new legal duties 
in this area. 
My sense, based on personal observations over the 
course of this period as well as the extensive documentary 
record, is that states were resistant to being “pushed” into 
action by an agency that did not have a clear mandate for 
climate change–related displacement and was perceived by 
some as mandate-hunting. In some respects, perhaps the 
“push” happened too quickly. Even at the time, UNHCR 
was internally conflicted about whether or not it should be 
attempting to become more heavily involved,10 and most of 
the legwork happened within the 12 months immediately 
preceding the ministerial meeting in December 2011 (which 
may have contributed to the view expressed by some states 
that there was insufficient research on which to progress 
deliberations).11 At the same time, UNHCR saw the anni-
versaries marked by that meeting (the 60th anniversary of 
the Refugee Convention and the 50th anniversary of the 
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness12) as providing 
a once-in-a-decade opportunity to advocate for enhanced 
protection commitments by states, and the meeting comple-
mented (and fed into) parallel discussions in other forums 
(e.g. International Organization for Migration [IOM], Rio 
+20, the UNFCCC process, Human Rights Council, and the 
International Law Commission) on the links between cli-
mate change, natural disasters, and displacement.
The Cancún Adaptation Framework13
The primary mechanism for the coordination of humani-
tarian assistance between relevant international United 
Nations (UN) and non-UN agencies is the Inter-Agency 
Standing Committee (IASC). In June 2008, the IASC estab-
lished a Task Force on Climate Change to raise awareness 
of and integrate climate change into various humanitarian 
agency programs and to encourage increased inter-agency 
analysis and cooperation.14 One of its key objectives was to 
“lead the preparation of high-quality analytical inputs to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) process,”15 and as Task Forcemembers, both 
UNHCR and the IOM were instrumental in advocating for 
cross-border displacement to be addressed in this context.16 
Through concerted engagement with the UNFCCC process, 
the IASC helped to build a dialogue between the climate 
negotiators and humanitarian community, and each sector 
was better able to understand the interests and needs of the 
other.17 Furthermore, joint submissions by the heads of key 
humanitarian agencies sent “a coordinated signal” to states 
parties about the relevance of migration and displacement 
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to their policy concerns, and the willingness of specialized 
agencies to support them in their endeavours.18 
In December 2010, the UN climate change conference 
(COP16) adopted the Cancún Adaptation Framework, which 
was the result of three years of negotiations on adaptation 
by states parties to the UNFCCC. In the Framework, states 
parties affirmed that adaptation must be given the same 
priority as mitigation, and that enhanced action and inter-
national cooperation on adaptation was urgently required 
to reduce vulnerability and build resilience.19 Paragraph 14 
invited all states parties to enhance action on adaptation 
under the Framework by undertaking, inter alia, “[m]eas-
ures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooper-
ation with regard to climate change induced displacement, 
migration and planned relocation, where appropriate at the 
national, regional and international levels.”20
That such a provision was included at all, and was framed 
in this way, was largely due to the interventions of the IASC 
and the support of a number of states and scholars.21 The 
provision has three important features. First, it deliberately 
avoids questions of causation and responsibility, which are 
inevitably fraught.22 Second, it frames movement broadly 
(not only as displacement) and acknowledges that migra-
tion and planned relocation can be forms of adaptation. 
Third, it recognizes the need for multipronged strategies at 
different levels of governance rather than a single, univer-
sal response. 
Koko Warner, a key participant in the drafting process, 
suggests that a crucial factor in states’ acceptance of the pro-
vision was because mobility was framed as a technical, rather 
than a political, issue, which was presented as a “legitimate 
part of a wider adaptation framework.”23 Ironically, had 
proposed references to “human rights” and “climate justice” 
been added here (as some delegates proposed), they would 
likely “have been a liability to the very inclusion of migra-
tion and displacement in the Copenhagen outcomes,”24 
given political sensitivities. 
From a legal perspective, the provision is very weak. It is 
couched within a non-binding “decision” of the states par-
ties to the UNFCCC and imposes no formal obligations on 
them, instead simply “inviting” them to undertake meas-
ures that assist “understanding, coordination and cooper-
ation” on climate change–related mobility. It requires states 
neither to implement migration programs nor to “protect” 
people displaced by climate change. Arguably, this is appro-
priate in this context: while the climate change regime pro-
vides a high-profile “hook” for consideration of the protec-
tion and assistance concerns arising from migration and 
displacement, it is not a suitable forum in which to examine 
the complexity of these issues in a structured or compre-
hensive way.
However, from an advocacy perspective, the provision 
has far greater significance. First, it evidences states’ recog-
nition of the impacts of climate change on human movement 
and the need for strategies to address this. Second, it pro-
vides an important reference point and a “catalytic role”25 
for future initiatives seeking to tease out precisely what such 
measures might look like. Indeed, it sets out “many sens-
ible options for beginning to think about (and undertake 
activities to address) the issue.”26 Third, it anticipates that 
planning for displacement, migration, and/or relocation 
will become part of states’ national adaptation plans27 and 
as such will be eligible for funding pursuant to the Green 
Climate Fund.28
Paragraph 14(f) of the Cancún Adaptation Framework 
was an important precursor to UNHCR’s actions in 
2011. It provided the impetus (and partial justification) 
for UNHCR’s strategy in 2011 to secure states’ agree-
ment to develop a global guiding framework on protec-
tion in the context of climate change and displacement, 
beginning with the Bellagio expert meeting in February 
of that year.29 An advantage of the provision was that it 
presented a state-determined point of reference for insti-
tutional actors to leverage action on climate change and 
mobility, in UNHCR’s case by demonstrating the need for 
a new normative framework by highlighting the gaps in 
the existing protection regime.30 Paragraph 14(f) was also 
invoked in the “Chairperson’s Summary” of the Nansen 
Conference on Climate Change and Displacement in the 
21st Century as “an important global affirmation of the 
need for measures related to migration, displacement and 
planned relocation” whose “implementation should be 
explored through appropriate fora,”31 and a stated reason 
for the creation of the Nansen Initiative in late 2012.32 The 
provision has thus been described “both as a matrix and a 
call for action.”33 
UNHCR’s Lead Role: Getting Climate Change 
and Displacement onto the International Agenda 
(2007–2010)
As noted above, UNHCR was one of the key institutional 
players in the IASC’s engagement with UNFCCC process 
and the lead author of a number of important submissions 
outlining the relationship between climate change and dis-
placement.34 It was inevitable that UNHCR would be drawn 
into the debate on climate change and mobility, not least 
because of the early (mis)framing of the issue as being about 
“climate refugees.” Internally, the organization remains div-
ided about the extent to which it should engage with the sub-
ject, and coordination of the area has been “passed around 
the agency like a ‘hot potato.’”35 Some states have voiced 
their disquiet with a perceived de facto shift in emphasis as 
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UNHCR engaged more and more with disaster-related dis-
placement and the High Commissioner continued to high-
light the protection gaps for those displaced by the impacts 
of disasters and climate change.36
UNHCR’s legal mandate does not extend to displace-
ment on account of disasters or the impacts of climate 
change,37 and this remains the chief obstacle to its formal 
involvement.38 However, the strong personal conviction 
of the High Commissioner, António Guterres, has driven 
the institution’s engagement with the issue.39 Describing 
climate change as “the defining challenge of our times,”40 
since 2007 Guterres has called on states to address con-
temporary circumstances in which there are “more and 
more people forced to move because of extreme depriva-
tion, environmental degradation and climate change.”41 
He has argued that UNHCR has a “duty to alert states to 
these problems and help find answers to the new challenges 
they represent”42—“[i]n line with [its] statutory responsibil-
ity for the progressive development of international law in 
areas of [its] concern”43—and in any case is the UN agency 
“with responsibilities and expertise in the area of forced 
displacement.”44 
In 2010, UNHCR’s Background Paper to the High 
Commissioner’s Dialogue on Protection Challenges—an 
annual forum involving states, non-governmental (NGOs) 
and intergovernmental organizations, and the research 
community—placed natural disasters and climate change 
on the agenda as new drivers of displacement. It noted 
that “conflict, extreme deprivation and climate change are 
tending to act more and more in combination; a trend that 
is likely to intensify.”45 For the first time, it also directed 
attention towards possible normative responses. Identifying 
“a lack of international guidance on meeting the protection 
needs of people forcibly displaced as a result of climate 
change, natural disasters and other circumstances that may 
fall outside the scope of the 1951 Convention,”46 the paper 
asked, “Is the current architecture of humanitarian action 
adequate or are new mandates, institutions, coalitions or 
partnerships required?”47 It suggested that “additional tools 
might be required to translate the needs of the displaced 
into tangible forms of protection.”48 A side event on climate 
change and displacement was also convened during the 
Dialogue and was well attended by state representatives and 
others, including the High Commissioner.49
In the lead-up to the 2011 commemoration of the 60th 
anniversary of the Refugee Convention and the 50th anni-
versary of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 
it was decided that UNHCR would use the opportunity to 
renew states’ interest in normative developments. The end 
goal was to secure pledges by states at a ministerial meet-
ing in December 2011 to address normative gaps, especially 
(but not solely) in the context of climate change and natural 
disasters.50 However, for UNHCR to secure sufficient sup-
port, a number of interim steps were required.
Bellagio Expert Meeting on Climate Change and 
Displacement (February 2011)
Having put the issue on the agenda at the 2010 Dialogue, 
UNHCR’s next step was to organize a closed Expert Meeting 
on Climate Change and Displacement, held in Bellagio in 
early 2011. Arguably, one of its strategic purposes of the 
meeting was to equip UNHCR with a sound and contem-
porary expert evidence base to provide at least tacit endorse-
ment of its end-of-year objective. UNHCR asked the experts 
to consider the following “key questions”:
•	 Is the present legal and policy framework sufficient?
•	 If not, is there a need for additional instruments to 
protect those displaced as a result of climate-related 
events?
•	 What legal and institutional responses could be con-
templated with respect to “sinking island” states?51
With the deliberations framed in this way, it was almost 
inevitable that the expert group would identify the need 
for further normative development, given the limitations 
of the existing legal and policy framework, which were 
already well known. Scholars were commissioned to write 
background papers highlighting the reach and limitations 
of existing international law in protecting those displaced 
by climate change impacts, and were asked to identify the 
elements that a guiding global framework might contain.52 
Although the expert group could not reach consensus on all 
issues, there was sufficient agreement on the following:
There is a need to develop a global guiding framework or instru-
ment to apply to situations of external displacement other than 
those covered by the 1951 Convention, especially displacement 
resulting from sudden-onset disasters. States, together with 
UNHCR and other international organizations, are encouraged 
to explore this further. Consideration would need to be given to 
whether any such framework or instrument ought also to cover 
other contemporary forms of external displacement …53
Given the magnitude of the issues involved, there is a need for 
a collaborative approach based on principles of international 
cooperation and burden – and responsibility-sharing. UNHCR’s 
expertise on the protection dimensions of displacement makes it 
a particularly valuable actor.54 
This provided an imprimatur for the next stage of 
UNHCR’s strategy: the Nansen Conference on Climate 
Change and Displacement in the 21st Century held in Oslo 
in June 2011.55
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The Nansen Conference and the Nansen Principles 
(June 2011)
The Nansen Conference was convened by the Government 
of Norway, with the Center for International Climate and 
Environmental Research (Oslo) and the Norwegian Refugee 
Council, to explore responses to the “double predicament” 
of climate change and forced migration.56 
Although UNHCR was not formally a co-sponsor of the 
event, it was a key player in its design. It was one of nine mem-
bers of the conference’s Advisory Board; it was singled out 
by the conference Chairperson, Margareta Wahlström (UN 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Disaster 
Risk Reduction for its “special support and involvement”;57 
and the High Commissioner was the only institutional head 
to speak in the opening plenary session. Furthermore, the 
name “Nansen” is inextricably bound with refugee protec-
tion: the famous Norwegian polar explorer and humanitar-
ian was the first High Commissioner for Refugees for the 
League of Nations.
The conference was important in building momentum 
for international cooperation on climate change and dis-
placement, especially because it brought together high-level 
actors from many UN and other international organiza-
tions, governments, NGOs, and the scientific and academic 
community from a wide range of disciplines. Its particular 
objective was to agree “a common set of broad principles,” to 
be known as the “Nansen Principles,” which would “under-
pin actions to prevent or manage displacement, and protect 
displaced people in the face of climate change.”58 
As a government-led initiative, the Nansen Conference 
could more easily sidestep the politics and sensitivities 
around institutional mandates by including all relevant 
international organizations, without one in particular tak-
ing control or setting the agenda. It provided a relatively 
neutral space for other states to participate and a platform 
for a wide and diverse array of researchers and policy-
makers to present. At the same time, the process clearly 
fed into UNHCR’s year-long plan to heighten states’ aware-
ness of the normative gaps, such that they would pledge 
at the December ministerial meeting to support UNHCR 
to develop a new global guiding framework on protection. 
Indeed, this was raised explicitly in the High Commissioner 
for Refugees’ opening address.59 
Norway had been one of the strongest state supporters of 
UNHCR’s efforts to place climate change–related displace-
ment on the international agenda. As early as 2007, it had 
encouraged UNHCR to “turn its attention to the issue of 
environmental degradation as a consequence of climate 
change, which was now at the top of the international 
agenda.”60 The Nansen Conference was framed squarely 
within the context of UNHCR’s own initiatives to further 
international deliberations on the issue. It was described 
as “a timely and natural follow-up of the [Bellagio] expert 
conference on climate change and displacement organised 
by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees in February”61 and an important precur-
sor to UNHCR’s ministerial meeting in December,62 and 
it was expected to feed into other policy processes, such 
as the upcoming UNFCCC negotiations and the Rio +20 
conference on sustainable development.63 In his opening 
address to the Nansen Conference, the High Commissioner 
introduced UNHCR’s vision for a “global guiding frame-
work for situations of cross-border displacement resulting 
from climate change and natural disasters”64 and said that 
states would be invited to make pledges in relation to gaps 
in the current protection regime at the ministerial meeting 
in December.65 In what could be interpreted as an appeal 
to states for an expanded mandate, he added that UNHCR 
could help to identify circumstances where such a frame-
work would be activated and “develop procedures and stan-
dards of treatment for affected populations.”66 
The most significant outcome of the conference was the 
Nansen Principles—a set of ten overarching principles 
designed to shape and inform further action on address-
ing the linkages between climate change and mobility, both 
normatively and practically. They reflected many of the 
“main messages” from UNHCR’s Bellagio expert meeting, 
including the idea of a global guiding framework.67 The 
Principles emphasize the duties of states to their own popu-
lations and their need to ensure that adequate legislation, 
institutions, and resources are put in place, especially with 
respect to disaster risk reduction strategies.68 However, they 
also state that a “more coherent and consistent approach 
at the international level is needed to meet the protection 
needs of people displaced externally owing to sudden-onset 
disasters,” and that “States, working in conjunction with 
UNHCR and other relevant stakeholders, could develop 
a guiding framework or instrument in this regard.”69 The 
Principles nderscore the complementary roles of local, 
national, regional, and international actors.
Differences of opinion as to how the Principles should 
be framed and what they should contain hinted at the 
immense difficulties that would be faced by UNHCR in its 
quest for a global guiding framework.70 Nevertheless, they 
reflect a policy consensus among key stakeholders and were 
proclaimed by the High Commissioner for Refugees as “a 
valuable contribution to the ministerial meeting that is 
planned for December.”71 
ExCom’s Standing Committee Meeting: June 2011
According to those involved in the process within UNHCR, 
the agency’s approach up to this point had been incremental, 
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and deliberately so. The first stage of its strategy—the 
Bellagio expert meeting and the Nansen Conference—was 
relatively successful, and there was no obvious backlash 
from states—an accomplishment that should not be under-
estimated, given their general reticence to develop further 
protection norms.72 
However, there was a discernible shift when states 
met at the Standing Committee of UNHCR’s Executive 
Committee (ExCom) later in June 2011. There, UNHCR put 
forward a proposal by the IASC for UNHCR to become the 
lead agency for coordinating protection responses in situa-
tions of natural disaster.73 UNHCR was already the inter-
agency cluster leader for international protection and for 
conflict-induced internal displacement, but there was no 
designated leader for natural disasters. The cluster leader 
for natural disasters was determined through a consultative 
process on a case-by-case basis, resulting in a lack of pre-
dictability in responses and delays in providing assistance.74 
Following extensive consultations with the UN’s Emergency 
Relief Coordinator from the Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the protection-man-
dated agencies, it was determined that UNHCR would be 
best placed to coordinate this response.75 
In essence, the proposal sought to formalize a role that 
UNHCR had already assumed in seven natural disasters 
between 2004 and 2011,76 and at this point it was to be only 
a one-year pilot scheme.77 Thus, in operational terms at 
least, it did not signify a radical shift in practice. However, it 
was controversial, not least because it dealt with internally 
displaced persons78—an already politically sensitive issue—
and generated concerns among states about UNHCR 
exceeding its mandate and operational capacity.79 While a 
number of states “recognized the need for strategies to deal 
with evolving forms of displacement, others urged prudence 
in this regard and suggested that the Office focus on ensur-
ing more effective implementation of existing tools.”80 One 
suspects that, for some delegations, granting UNHCR a for-
mal operational role with respect to protection in natural 
disasters was a step too far: from there it was a slippery slope 
to UNHCR becoming the “forced migration” agency, rather 
than the “refugee” agency, and from providing humanitar-
ian “assistance” in disasters, to acquiring a new legal “pro-
tection” mandate. Anecdotal evidence from some observers 
at the meeting suggests that the proposal sparked some of 
the most intense reactions by states ever witnessed in that 
forum.81 Although almost half of the delegates who spoke 
expressed support for the proposal in principle, many had 
reservations about the desirability of permitting UNHCR 
to assume additional responsibilities and activities.82 The 
majority of states emphasized that UNHCR should focus on 
its mandated responsibilities. Some remained unconvinced 
of the need for UNHCR to take on this extra role and 
called for further independent evaluation and information 
to show why it was required, as well as further discussion 
(including in the General Assembly).83 States’ concerns 
centred on mandate implications, resources and capacity, 
exit strategies, and questions about state sovereignty (given 
that this would deal with internal displacement—still a very 
sensitive issue within the UNHCR context).84 As a result, 
“[t]here was a clear call for postponement of any designa-
tion of responsibility as lead agency for protection in situa-
tions of natural disaster until outstanding questions were 
answered.”85
This did not bode well for the ministerial meeting in 
December. Even though the issue at the Standing Committee 
meeting was framed somewhat differently, it nonetheless 
suggested that if states were reluctant to grant additional 
operational responsibilities to UNHCR in the field of disas-
ters and protection, it was unlikely that they would commit 
to developing further responsibilities for themselves. 
Statement to the UN Security Council  
(November 2011)
Two weeks prior to the ministerial meeting, the High 
Commissioner for Refugees had the opportunity to address 
a UN Security Council briefing. In an impassioned state-
ment, he explained that increasing numbers of people were 
“being forced to flee due to reasons that are not covered 
by the 1951 Refugee Convention”86 and described climate 
change as “the defining challenge of our times … which 
is adding to the scale and complexity of human displace-
ment.”87 He concluded that “it would be appropriate for the 
international community to formulate and adopt a set of 
principles, specifically designed to reinforce the protection 
of and to find solutions for people who have been forced to 
leave their own country as a result of catastrophic environ-
mental events, and who may not qualify for refugee status 
under international law.” Urging all UN member states to 
support this initiative, he reminded them of the upcoming 
ministerial meeting “where we will examine these and other 
protection gaps affecting the world’s forcibly displaced 
people.”88
UNHCR’S Ministerial Meeting (December 2011)
The ministerial meeting of December 2011 was a “land-
mark” event, attended by representatives of 155 states 
(including 72 ministers) to commemorate the 60th anni-
versary of the Refugee Convention and the 50th anniversary 
of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.89 Given 
the small number of states that had indicated they would 
support UNHCR’s call for normative expansion, there was 
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a foreboding that the meeting held limited possibilities on 
this front. 
In his opening address, the High Commissioner raised 
the theme of displacement on account of natural disasters 
and described climate change as “the key factor in accelerat-
ing all other drivers of forced displacement.”90 He noted that 
while the majority of those affected would remain within 
their own countries, those who did cross an international 
border would not be considered refugees but also would not 
be “truly migrants,” because they would not have moved 
voluntarily. Accordingly, they would find themselves “in a 
legal void.”91 The call to action was couched in the following 
terms: “So while the nature of forced displacement is rapidly 
evolving, the responses available to the international com-
munity have not kept pace. This has created a number of 
serious protection gaps, particularly in the context of mixed 
movements, large-scale complex emergencies and environ-
mentally-related displacement. Whilst some national and 
regional initiatives have sought to address such gaps, there 
is no coherent international framework for protecting the 
rights of persons who are displaced across borders owing to 
forces other than persecution, serious human rights viola-
tions and ongoing conflict.”92
The meeting comprised plenary sessions and two roundt-
ables, one of which was entitled “Protection Challenges 
and Opportunities: Where Will We Be in Ten Years?” It 
was in this context that the absence of a “coherent inter-
national normative framework for protecting the rights of 
persons who are displaced across borders owing to forces 
other than persecution, serious human rights violations and 
ongoing conflict” was raised for discussion.93 Under this 
topic, UNHCR posed the following questions for states to 
consider: 
Could the existing normative framework be consolidated to more 
clearly identify where there are gaps? Reflecting upon existing 
good practice, could national responses and regional arrange-
ments be further developed to fill these gaps? Would it be useful 
for States, UNHCR and other relevant actors to develop a global 
guiding framework or instrument to apply to situations of dis-
placement across borders other than those covered by the 1951 
Convention? If so, should this be limited to displacement relating 
to climate change and natural disasters, or could it be broader? 
Could temporary or interim protection arrangements be useful? 
If so, in which situations?94
UNHCR had hoped that this would encourage states to 
pledge to develop such a normative framework. However, 
only five states did. The pledge was made jointly by Norway 
and Switzerland, and endorsed by Costa Rica,95 Germany, 
and Mexico. It read, “A more coherent and consistent 
approach at the international level is needed to meet the 
protection needs of people displaced externally owing to 
sudden-onset disasters, including where climate change 
plays a role. We therefore pledge to cooperate with inter-
ested states, UNHCR and other relevant actors with the 
aim of obtaining a better understanding of such cross bor-
der movements at relevant regional and sub-regional levels, 
identifying best practices and developing consensus on how 
best to assist and protect the affected people.”96
Germany also stated that it was “ready to lend its sup-
port to initiatives that contribute to analyzing the impact 
of climate change and finding strategies to curb its effects, 
and help vulnerable populations build up a higher level of 
resilience.”97
Only four other states made reference to protection gaps 
relating to climate change and natural disasters. Latvia did 
not endorse the pledge but did note that in reflecting on 
the work needed to ensure the continuing relevance of the 
refugee protection regime, “serious consideration should 
be given to the consequences of global climate change.”98 
Argentina pledged to strengthen the implementation of 
mechanisms that it had adopted to respond to “new situations 
that are not envisaged in the international instruments for 
refugee protection,” including “special temporary resettle-
ment” which applies, inter alia, to people who, “despite not 
requiring international protection, are temporarily unable 
to return to their countries of origin due to the prevailing 
humanitarian conditions or owing to the consequences 
generated by natural disasters or man-made environmental 
disasters.”99 China promised to share knowledge in the 
area of disaster relief, mitigation, and preparation,100 while 
Burundi said it would take urban refugees into account in 
strategies to reduce poverty and disaster risk.101 The Inter-
Parliamentary Union’s support for “new approaches to deal 
with those displaced within or across national boundaries 
owing to environmental factors and natural disasters linked 
to climate change” was also noted.102
At the end of the meeting, a ministerial communiqué was 
issued. This did not refer to the topic of natural disasters 
or climate change, but instead noted only in general, and 
rather underwhelming, terms that “today’s challenges in 
providing protection and achieving solutions continue to be 
serious, interconnected and complex. In this regard, we rec-
ognize the importance of enhancing international solidar-
ity, strengthening action in accordance with the principles 
enshrined in applicable instruments and finding durable 
solutions. We will reinforce cooperation with each other 
and work with UNHCR and other relevant stakeholders, as 
appropriate, to deepen our understanding of evolving pat-
terns of displacement and to agree upon ways to respond to 
the challenges we face in a changing global context.”103
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As Walter Kälin has explained, this was not accidental 
but was a deliberate expression of “a lack of willingness by 
a majority of governments, whether from reasons of sover-
eignty, competing priorities or the lead role of UNHCR in 
the process,”104 to engage with displacement linked to dis-
asters or climate change.
The Nansen Initiative (October 2012)
With such minimal support from states, UNHCR was in 
no position to advocate actively for a new “global guid-
ing framework.” It was apparent that states did not want 
to be “pushed” into action either by institutional actors or 
through an experts-based approach “introduced through 
the back door”105—a criticism some states had made about 
the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.106 Thus, 
any new initiative would have to be driven from different 
quarters. 
The Norwegian and Swiss governments considered that 
an intergovernmental process would best be able to take 
into account “the strong sensitivities of states towards the 
topic.”107 They detected in the ministerial communiqué “a 
certain, albeit very general, readiness to engage in a soft 
dialogue and to collect and share experience and practi-
ces in handling [climate change-related] displacement.”108 
Accordingly, in October 2012, they launched the Nansen 
Initiative on Disaster-Induced Cross-Border Displacement 
with the aim of building “a consensus on key principles 
and elements regarding the protection of persons displaced 
across borders in the context of natural disasters that sets 
the agenda for future action at domestic, regional and inter-
national levels.”109
The direct genesis of the Nansen Initiative was the 
joint pledge that Norway and Switzerland had made at 
the UNHCR ministerial meeting. This, in turn, had been 
stimulated by developments over the course of 2010–11: 
States’ agreement at Cancún to enhance understanding 
and cooperation on climate change–induced migration, 
displacement, and relocation; and the Nansen Principles 
(especially Principles II and IX) that had emerged from the 
Nansen Conference and also been shaped by the findings of 
the Bellagio expert meeting.110 
The Nansen Initiative, which will be operational 
from 2013 to 2015, is designed to promote a “bottom-up” 
approach to the issue. First, a series of sub-regional consul-
tations will be conducted to gather more information about 
the varying challenges faced—as well as good practices 
adopted—in different parts of the world.111 They will focus 
on the various phases of displacement—preparedness prior 
to displacement, protection and assistance during displace-
ment, and solutions following displacement.112 It is hoped 
that this process will enable national and sub-regional 
idiosyncrasies to be addressed and trust to be fostered 
between states.113
Second, through a global dialogue, the Nansen Initiative 
aims to develop a non-binding Protection Agenda based on 
three pillars: international cooperation and solidarity; stan-
dards for the treatment of affected people regarding admis-
sion, stay, and status; and operational responses, including 
funding mechanisms and responsibilities of international 
humanitarian and development actors.114 It is envisaged 
that the Protection Agenda will serve as “a framework for 
further normative, institutional and operational develop-
ment at different levels.”115
While the Initiative’s approach may be criticized as too 
tentative, it seems to be the only feasible strategy at this 
point in time. As the envoy, Walter Kälin, explained at 
the first Consultative Committee meeting, an absence of 
sufficient knowledge about “what happens on the ground” 
would make it difficult at this stage to draft a set of guid-
ing principles adequately reflecting realities, and there is of 
course the practical obstacle as well, namely “the difficulty 
of getting governments on board with the idea of producing 
a normative framework right away.”116
Even though the Nansen Initiative is state-led, there is a 
strong emphasis on its being an “open, dynamic, and inclu-
sive process” that will actively involve non-state stakehold-
ers.117 Otherwise, there is a risk that it would “suffer from 
lack of relevance.”118 Co-chaired by Norway and Switzerland, 
it is overseen by a steering group that also includes Australia, 
Bangladesh, Costa Rica, Germany, Mexico, Kenya, and the 
Philippines. The composition of the steering group aims to 
ensure adequate and balanced representation from the global 
North and South.119 A consultative committee comprising 
representatives from relevant international organizations, 
NGOs, think tanks, and academics informs and supports the 
process. The envoy of the chairmanship is to represent the 
Initiative and provide strategic advice, while a small secretar-
iat in Geneva provides logistical support.120 
Of the international organizations involved, UNHCR 
has a special role: it is a member of the steering commit-
tee and was a “catalyst” in putting the issue higher on the 
international agenda.121 During the launch of the Initiative, 
one sensed a certain suspicion by states about UNHCR’s 
role in the process, with both France and the United States 
separately seeking clarification of the precise nature of its 
involvement,122 and others calling for IOM to be closely 
engaged.123 At the launch, the envoy explained that IOM 
“would be an important partner in the process,”124 and sub-
sequently affirmed that “UNHCR, IOM and the Norwegian 
Refugee Council will play active roles.”125
In terms of the Nansen Initiative’s substantive work, it 
is significant that its focus is disaster-induced cross-border 
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displacement. Earlier iterations of its mandate referred to 
natural disasters “particularly in the context of climate 
change,” but the decision to remove such references was 
strategic. In part, this was to diffuse political sensitivities 
around the climate change–displacement nexus, and in 
part to circumvent the empirical and conceptual difficulties 
with causation, which could serve as a distraction to policy 
development if states were otherwise committed to finding 
pragmatic ways forward.126 It thus goes beyond paragraph 
14(f) of the Cancún Adaptation Framework in that it consid-
ers not only climate change–related but geophysical disas-
ters as well.127
Of course, from a “climate justice” perspective, it could 
be argued that the Initiative’s focus on disasters, rather than 
climate change, misses an important opportunity to high-
light the impact of climate change on human mobility and, 
in particular, to leverage climate change funding and assist-
ance. However, as explored below, in reality this has not 
prevented the Initiative from examining climate change–
related mobility. From a pragmatic perspective, focusing on 
“disasters” rather than “climate change” was key to securing 
(some) states’ cooperation and support, and thus facilitating 
the potential reach and influence of the Initiative. And, as 
was noted in the “Chairperson’s Summary” of the Nansen 
Conference on Climate Change and Displacement, “From a 
protection perspective, there is no compelling reason to dis-
tinguish between displacement due to climate-related and 
other disasters.”128
The breadth of the Nansen Initiative’s remit depends, 
though, on how the concept of “disaster” is understood. 
The Initiative adopts the definition of “disaster” used by 
the humanitarian community within the UN: “A serious 
disruption of the functioning of a community or a soci-
ety involving widespread human, material, economic or 
environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the abil-
ity of the affected community or society to cope using its 
own resources.”129 Importantly, rather than conceptualiz-
ing a “disaster” as an event, the emphasis is instead on its 
consequences—the coping capacity of those affected. This is 
particularly important, given the Initiative’s focus on both 
“sudden-onset disasters” (defined as “hydro-meteorological 
hazards such as flooding, windstorms or mudslides, and 
geophysical hazards including earthquakes, tsunamis or 
volcano eruptions”) and “slow-onset disasters” (defined as 
“environmental degradation processes such as droughts and 
desertification, increased salinization, rising sea levels or 
thawing of permafrost”).130 While the concept of a “slow-
onset disaster” seems counterintuitive if one thinks of a 
“disaster” as an “event” that happens (like a flood or land-
slide), it makes sense when a disaster denotes diminished 
coping capacity. 
However, the concept note explains that slow-onset dis-
asters come within the ambit of the Initiative only “in their 
end phase (i.e. when droughts or rising sea levels create 
life-threatening situations),” since this is when their effects 
“may be very similar to those of sudden-onset disasters.”131 
It emphasizes that the relevant distinction “should not be 
the character of the disaster but rather whether it triggers 
displacement understood as forced movement of persons 
as opposed to voluntary migration.”132 This sits uncom-
fortably with scenarios where migration is a rational and 
desirable form of adaptation,133 such as in some small island 
states. As Elizabeth Ferris has remarked, “[S]udden-onset 
disasters—cyclones, hurricanes, earthquakes … are the 
‘easy’ events to identify.”134 The greater challenge lies in 
responding to the impacts of slower processes, which pot-
entially pose a more permanent risk to the sustainability of 
certain human settlements in the longer term. The concept 
note states only that the Nansen Initiative “should be open 
to look at the close relationship” between cross-border dis-
placement and related issues such as “migration as adapta-
tion.”135 Without sustained examination of the latter, it is 
inevitable that protection gaps will remain. Furthermore, it 
is crucial that the existence of the Initiative is not used as an 
excuse to delay policy development in these areas. 
Of course, it remains to be seen precisely how states 
involved in the Initiative will conceptualize “displacement” 
and “disasters,” especially once the sub-regional consul-
tations have highlighted the challenges faced in specific 
contexts (including small island states). Could the idea of 
a “creeping disaster”136 be one way of incorporating antici-
patory movement as a protection response? As the Initiative 
has already acknowledged, the legal challenge will be to 
identify the “tipping point where the basically voluntary 
movement of persons turns into forced movement.” Since, 
operationally, there may be considerable overlap between 
the two, “it [is] necessary to ensure that victims of forced 
displacement triggered by slow-onset disasters receive pro-
tection and assistance, too.”137 
The outcomes of the first sub-regional consultation, held 
in the Cook Islands in May 2013, are reassuring on this 
front. The concept of “disasters” did not constrain delibera-
tions or recommended actions for further action. Longer-
term processes affecting mobility were a key part of the dis-
cussions, and many of the final recommendations related 
to long-term planning, including with respect to creating 
migration pathways, finding suitable land for resettlement, 
and ensuring that climate change adaptation and mitiga-
tion efforts continue.138 
Further, the absence of “climate change” from the 
Nansen Initiative’s mandate did not seem to hamper 
its work either. In fact, the Initiative’s focus on disasters 
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appears to have widened, rather than obscured, the kinds 
of deliberations that would have occurred had the focus 
been on climate change alone. For example, the Pacific con-
sultation was entitled “Human Mobility, Natural Disasters 
and Climate Change in the Pacific,” reflecting the specific 
challenges facing that region. As Prime Minister Henry 
Puna noted in his opening address, “Climate change is one 
of the most pressing concerns that we—as Small Islands 
Developing States—face in the Pacific.”139 The consulta-
tion considered questions of loss and damage within the 
UNFCCC process, and some participants raised the pos-
sibility of international climate change adaptation funds 
being utilized for disaster risk management, preparation, 
and planned movement. Indeed, as noted above, the cre-
ation of the Nansen Initiative was itself a response to para-
graph 14(f) of the Cancún Adaptation Framework, and its 
sub-regional consultations are structured around the three 
forms of mobility outlined there: displacement, migration, 
and planned relocation.
Conclusion
The creation of a new international treaty on climate change 
and displacement now seems even more unlikely than ever 
before.140 On the one hand, this is because of enhanced 
understanding within the international community about 
the conceptual difficulties involved in attributing displace-
ment to the impacts of climate change alone. On the other 
hand, it stems from states’ reluctance to assume new legal 
obligations in the protection context—in other words, a 
lack of political will. There has been strong pushback from 
states when questions of normative development or man-
date extension have been proposed by UNHCR and others. 
States have made clear that they wish to control any initia-
tives on this front, and that they are prepared only to take 
tentative steps at this stage. 
What might this say about the development of protection 
norms more generally? Even the adoption of soft law has 
become increasingly contentious in recent years. ExCom 
Conclusions, for example, have become increasingly diffi-
cult to negotiate141 and weaker in their normative content. 
Yet, while it is clear that even achieving soft law frameworks 
will take time, this is not necessarily a bad thing. Soft law 
can be important in creating a basis for dialogue between 
states and can enable them to experiment with new ideas 
without assuming formal commitments.142 In the context 
of climate change, disasters, and displacement, it is impera-
tive that protection frameworks are attuned to the needs 
of those who will move, which means that they must be 
underpinned and informed by high-quality research. The 
collaborative approach advocated by the Nansen Initiative 
holds considerable promise for sustained dialogue between 
governments, organizations, and researchers, and—funda-
mentally—each of these constituencies must also ensure that 
the voices of affected communities are heard if a new pro-
tection agenda is to be truly responsive to needs. Ultimately, 
the goodwill of all stakeholders to listen, share knowledge, 
and build trust will enable the international community to 
take its first steps towards building a normative framework 
on protection in the context of disaster-induced cross-bor-
der displacement.
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